Marc Ravalomanana, Al Jazeera, May 2009

MORE HERE...

Recent interviews (constant update)

Dimitris Koukoulas, EurActiv, May 2009
(On EU-Bosnian relations)

Marc Ravalomanana, Al Jazeera, May 2009 (Video)
(On Madagascar's domestic political situation)

Morgan Tsvangirai, Foreign Policy, May 2009
(On Zimbabwe's unity government)

Dominique Strauss-Kahn, France 24, May 2009 (Video)
(On the IMF's assistance to the Ivory Coast)

Danny Ayalon, France 24, May 2009 (Video)
(On the Middle East peace process and Iran)

Mirek Topolánek, France 24, May 2009 (Video)
(On the 2009 Czech presidency of the EU)

Laurent Gbagbo, France 24, May 2009 (Video)
(On Ivory Coast's November 2009 elections)

Patxi López, Euronews, May 2009 (Video)
(On Basque country politics)

Karel Schwarzenberg, Euronews, May 2009 (Video)
(On EU June 2009 parliamentary elections)

Rachid M Rachid, Financial Times, May 2009 (Video)
(On Egypt's economic reform process)

Saeb Erekat, Financial Times, May 2009 (Video)
(On the Middle East peace process)

Nasser Judeh, Financial Times, May 2009 (Video)
(On the Middle East peace process)

Saad al-Hariri, Financial Times, May 2009 (Video)
(On Lebanon's economic stability)

Edson Lobao, Financial Times, May 2009 (Video)
(On Brazil's oil resources)

Stjepan Mesić, Financial Times, May 2009 (Video)
(On Croatia's economic standing)

27 EU leaders, Der Spiegel, May 2009
(On the EU's June 2009 parliamentary elections)

Erik Solheim, Der Spiegel, May 2009
(On Sri Lanka's civil war)

Sadiq Khan, Asharq Al-Awsat, May 2009
(On British-Saudi intelligence cooperation)

Muhammad Abdullahi Omar, Asharq Al-Awsat, May 2009
(On Somalia's civil war)

Nawaf al-Musawi, Asharq Al-Awsat, May 2009
(On Lebanon's June 2009 general elections)

Issaias Afeworki, Asharq Al-Awsat, May 2009
(On Eritrean politics)

Azad Horaz and Hofal Musa, Asharq Al-Awsat, May 2009
(On Kurdish anti-Iranian activities)

Nechirvan Barzani, Asharq Al-Awsat, May 2009
(On Kurdish Regional Government activities)

Murat Karayilan, Asharq Al-Awsat, May 2009
(On PKK activities and the Kurdish issue)

Mohamed El Baradei, Der Spiegel, May 2009
(On nuclear proliferation and the Bush administration)

Reuven Rivlin, Der Spiegel, May 2009
(On the Pope's May 2009 visit to Israel)

David Petraeus, RFE/RL, May 2009
(On U.S. military strategy in the Middle East, Central and South Asia)

Barack Obama, New York Times, April 2009
(On U.S. economic recovery)

MORE HERE...

Recent analyses

Rwanda, the standard-bearer? By Ashley Lewis
(Interview of Rwandan President Paul Kagame)

El Salvador: out of the dark? By Juliana Bruton
(Interview of Salvadoran President-elect Mauricio Funes)

Darfur: between reality and fiction, By Lucy Betteridge
(Interview of ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo)

MORE HERE...

Analysis: Rwanda, the standard-bearer?

Paul Kagame, Jeune Afrique, March 2009
(On Rwanda's internal and foreign policies)

Analysis by Ashley Lewis. April 23, 2009
(Creative Commons photo)

After years of tumultuous history in his country, Rwanda's President, Paul Kagame, has begun to introduce initiatives and governance policies that will aim to symbolize a progressive Republic of Rwanda whilst maintaining autonomy, independence, and sovereignty for the Central African nation.

President Kagame became head of his state in 1994, the year that the Rwandan genocide occurred. Previously, he gained notoriety as a leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi political party held up by refugees and currently the ruling political party in Rwanda. Kagame's involvement in the party and his alleged involvement in the assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana led the International Criminal Court (ICC) to accuse him of sparking his country's genocide.

Another controversial chapter of Kagame's history, which he discusses and defends here in an interview with Jeune Afrique, is his initiative of placing Rwandan troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in order to --according to the president-- fight the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a group of Hutu rebels. The Rwandan president describes the situation in the DRC as ‘a security problem, brought on by a historical conflict that everyone knows' and defends his position by citing the importance of the cooperation established between himself and Congolese President Joseph Kabila, which he insists was not encouraged by external pressures from the United States but was instead a completely autonomous decision.

This obvious and forced assertion of independence is a constant theme throughout Kagame’s interview with Jeune Afrique, as he claims autonomy in entering the DRC, the rejection of the notion of external pressure from Sweden and the Netherlands in the form of suspending aid, pressure from France toward reconciliation between the two countries as a result of France’s involvement with the Rwandan genocide, and the ICC’s recent regional arrest warrants.

Much of Kagame’s justification for opposing external involvement in all its forms is his suspicion of an external political agenda. For example, the president has refused to support the ICC and has failed to enforce its arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. Mr. Kagame states that this is not because he believes the Sudanese leader to be innocent or because he does not believe in justice, but instead because he can ‘feel and detect, in its [the ICC’s] very selective way of working, a mixture of political agenda and manipulation by the rich against the poor.’ He cites, as an example, that while many crimes against humanity have been committed throughout the world in the recent past the ICC's warrants seem to be targeted at 'Southern' leaders only.

Kagame’s strong ideals toward independent African nations motivate him to call on African countries to reject foreign aid, and to ‘learn to exist without it,’ a stark contrast to Zimbabwe’s recent call for USD 2 billion in aid to help fight the country's cholera epidemic.

President Kagame’s struggle to convert Rwanda into an autonomous and economically independent nation certainly shows some conviction, demonstrated by the president's personal and at times bold initiatives. His dream of an economically independent Africa however might not be around the corner just yet.

MORE HERE...

Analysis: El Salvador: out of the dark?

Mauricio Funes, El Mundo, March 2009
(On El Salvador's transition to democracy)

Analysis by Juliana Bruton. March 26, 2009
(Creative Commons photo)

The president-elect of El Salvador, Mauricio Funes, in an interview with Álvaro Cruz Rojas for the Salvadoran newspaper Diario El Mundo rebuked claims made by his rivals and set out his plans for the future of politics, economics, and civil liberties in El Salvador.

This interview was given on Saturday the March 14, just before the historic win of the country´s first leftist president; a very significant victory considering the fact that Mauricio Funes represents the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), the party of El Salvador´s former leftist guerrillas. This win echoes a now-classic trend across Latin America of leftist parties entering power.

The question is, however, which type of leftist government will Mauricio Funes´ represent? Will he foster close ties with leaders such as Venezuela´s Hugo Chavez, a path the opposition insists he will follow, or will he imitate the policies and leadership style of another, more moderate leftist leader, Brazil´s Luis Inacio Lula da Silva?

Whichever path he chooses to follow, Mr. Funes will necessarily face a great challenge. In one of Latin America´s most unequal countries in terms of wealth distribution, his supporters, mostly the country´s poor, have very high expectations. After such a polarising and confrontational election campaign, he will also face the great challenge of balancing pressures from inside his party to move to the left with those of the right wing opposition, which will still hold strong positions in the new parliament.

How will Mr. Funes ensure both sides are happy, and how will he heal such deeply embedded ideological and political rifts? “I am aware that when I started this campaign there was a very polarised environment, but I have conducted a campaign that sought to close wounds and the divisions that separated us and prescribe a message of national unity,” he told El Mundo.

The slogan of Funes´ campaign was “cambio seguro,” secure change. He insisted that change will be marked by stability. There will be no rupture with the existing economic and legal national system, but instead a change of public management. In Funes’ eyes, over the 20 years of the ARENA's (National Republican Alliance) rule, an exclusive and authoritarian public management model was followed under which a small group of interests were favoured and decisions were implemented without proper consultation. “This has got to change,” he insists.

The future leader is fully aware that he will not enjoy an outright majority, and therefor envisions the new government as one of national unity; “a government that works on building political and social understanding, one that is in a state of permanent negotiation.” He also expressed hope that the rival party and current government understand that they have to “build the broadest consensus possible so that we can get the country out of the crisis in which we find ourselves.”

Mr. Funes is looking for cooperation in areas such as fiscal expenditure, tax evasion, and smuggling. As regards fears from the right that he will turn El Salvador into a socialist state, the president-elect aimed to allay these fears by stating that “we are not going to build socialism nor are we setting out the foundations to build socialism in future presidencies.”

Among those in El Salvador who fear what this change of government could mean, those in the business community perhaps need the most reassuring. Funes insisted that “business people have nothing to fear from a Mauricio Funes government... I will respect the investments of businesspeople.” An accusation often levelled is that Funes plans to nationalise many of the countries industries, just as President Chavez has done in Venezuela. According to the leader, however, “the thought has not even crossed [his] mind.” He will not reverse the privatisations that have taken place. Instead, his government will strengthen regulation. Yet, while he insists that he is “not going to control prices,” he will “stabilize them” by “ensuring competition.”

Funes also highlighted that he is looking to strengthen relations with the United States and countries like Brazil, while at the same time distancing himself from Mr. Chavez and any possible ties with Iran. “I am not going to hand over the country to anybody but the Salvadorans to whom it belongs,” he asserted. “He [Chavez] has nothing to do with the internal dealings of our country.”

According to Mr. Funes, this accusation of the right is one that is based on historical links that the FMLN has with President Chávez, ties which he says he respects, but will not be bound by. Funes instead will focus on strengthening Central America and furthering El Salvador´s relationship with the United States. He will also look to build further relations with President Lula da Silva, admitting that “I have observed with great attention what other Latin American leaders are doing, in particular president Lula.”

Finally, responding to the accusations that he will threaten public and individual liberties and freedom he responds by insisting that they are “fully guaranteed” and that “we are not going to do anything that will put these liberties at risk.” The president-elect insists that there will be no threat to press freedom, even for those who express opposing views to the government.

Only time will tell how things will shape out in El Salvador, but for now, from his rhetoric at least, it appears Mauricio Funes will follow a more moderate path than certain other Latin American socialist leaders. Either way, he will still have to focus on building bridges and reassuring opponents if he wants to succeed.

MORE HERE...

Analysis: Darfur, between reality and fiction

Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Foreign Policy, February 2009
(On Omar al-Bashir and the International Criminal Court)

Analysis by Lucy Betteridge. March 26, 2009
(Creative Commons photo, RFI/AFP)

The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) recent decision to issue an arrest warrant for the president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir has sparked discussion about the usefulness of criminal justice in solving international crises. ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s recent interview with Foreign Policy magazine describes how he sees his role in the crisis and gives insight into his strategies for tackling three challenges that must be dealt with in this case.

One such challenge is dealing with the effects that issuing the indictment might have on the peace process and humanitarian situation on the ground. When asked about this issue it is clear that Moreno-Ocampo sees ICC proceedings as separate from any political or humanitarian process occurring in Darfur. By stating that negotiators need to incorporate decisions by the Court as a part of the “reality” of the situation, the prosecutor is asserting the Court’s independence as an institution as well as, to a certain extent, asserting the Court’s ability to influence the political situatio along its own lines.

Proponents of judicial impartiality would argue that such a position is essential to maintaining the judicial integrity of the Court. Others have argued, on the other hand, that the warrant will be impossible to execute and can only result in increased hardship for the people of Darfur. They point to Sudanese president al-Bashir’s public statements to this effect and to the fact that at least 15 aid agencies have been expelled from the country since the warrant was issued a few weeks ago. Exactly how al-Bashir’s actions will effect the situation on the ground still remains to be seen (and may be hard to discern), but aid cut-offs are certainly no good preliminary sign.

The judges of Pre-Trial Chamber I decided to issue a warrant against President al-Bashir for only two of the three crimes described in the prosecutor’s application, excluding that of genocide. The crime of genocide set forth in the Rome Statute uses the definition from the Genocide Convention of 1948 (as do many tribunals with the crime in their jurisdiction). Proving the highly specific intent requirement of the crime has been seen as a challenge since the application was filed in July 2008, considering that Commission of Inquiry Report on Darfur did not see the situation in Darfur as rising to the level of genocide and that very few individuals have been successfully prosecuted for genocide.

In order to issue a warrant for the crime of genocide, Pre-Trial Chamber judges must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect had the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Moreno-Ocampo is making a “subtle genocide” argument—that al-Bashir’s policies and actions could only be developed by a person intent on destroying ethnic groups in the region. He also emphasizes al-Bashir’s employment of state mechanisms and disregard of conditions set by the international community as evidence of genocidal intent. Yet the Pre-Trial Chamber seems not to have been reasonably satisfied that this intent could be proven based on the evidence provided the prosecutor.

The warrant could be amended to include the crime of genocide, should further evidence that could possibly prove the crime come to light. The prosecutor, however, will likely require something more concrete than the idea that al-Bashir’s actions could only be carried out by someone who intended to commit genocide.

The very last question of the interview mentions the United States' role in obtaining the ICC's warrant. The question seeks to assess just how much cooperation or interference the ICC expects to receive from Washington, considering that official U.S. policy has often been disengagement from and opposition to the ICC in the past. Mr. Moreno-Ocampo’s answer seizes upon the salient point in this situation —the situation in Darfur was referred by the UN Security Council using its Chapter 7 powers under the UN Charter. In this situation, all countries, regardless of their position on the ICC are required to cooperate with the Court. If countries took this obligation seriously, executing the arrest warrant would be a relatively simple matter. In reality, however, there are few ways to enforce this obligation, as it seems unlikely that a military intervention could be mustered to execute the warrant, especially since the international community has been unable to intervene to stop the atrocities committed up to this point.

Inability to compel execution of an arrest warrant highlights an ongoing issue for the ICC —the difficulty of constituting a court without a police force. One of the issues with a judicial approach to situations such as that of Darfur is the huge gap between theory and reality. Luis Moreno-Ocampo seems to be aware of the challenges he faces —whether or not he has the resources and successful strategies to bridge the gap between theory and practice remains to be seen.

MORE HERE...

Analysis: Keep cool, South Africa

Jacob Zuma, Al Jazeera, February 2009 (Video)
(On South African politics)

Analysis by Ashley Lewis. March 13, 2009
(Creative Commons photo, retrieved from southernafrica.files.wordpress.com)

South African President Kgalema Motlanthe recently made the announcement that his country will hold its next presidential elections on April 22. This announcement, however, is not the only indicator of upcoming elections; violence has erupted between party activists on both sides of the aisle as well, a phenomenon which has become dangerously common in the run up to several of the African continent's elections. However, in spite of the seemingly common attribute of violence amongst many African countries in electoral seasons, South Africa’s situation is not projected to become a seriously unstable one in the way of Zimbabwe or Kenya.

For one, South Africa is the most developed and stable of countries in the sub-Saharan region, both economically and politically. In addition, despite repeated eruptions of pre-electoral violence in the past, South Africa's democracy has not been crippled; if anything it has been strengthened. Party heads are removed when their actions are deemed inappropriate, as was the case with the removal Thabo Mbeki from the African National Congress (ANC), his own and dominating party in South Africa. And such rotations are not rare.

In fact, in an interview with Al Jazeera, Jacob Zuma, the presidential nominee for the ANC and the coming election's most promising candidate, states with regards to the ongoing pre-electoral violence that "everybody recognizes that this is the special quality of South Africans," implying that this is just a normal attribute of elections and should not be taken as an indicator of looming state failure.

Another reason for the unique quality of the upcoming elections is the talk of possible real opposition to the ruling establishment. The opposition party, or Congress of the People (COPE), is a splinter party of ANC and has attracted several of its dissidents since the removal of the ANC's former head Thabo Mbeki. Although the ANC is still projected to win the elections, its popularity has been waning (as illustrated by the emergence of COPE in 2008) and there has been talk that ANC may lose its two-thirds majority in parliament.

Jacob Zuma, however, does not seem to view COPE and its rise as a threat to ANC power. He attributes the dissidents' inability to lead to their still-recent emergence and to their alleged lack of democracy in their internal leadership selection. He also states that, "the people of COPE themselves are no longer happy. In fact they are coming back to the ANC ordinary membership, in droves."

Of course only the South African people can say, with their votes, how badly they want to see a change in leadership later this year.



Learn more about this topic:

On Jacob Zuma's corruption charges

On COPE's standing against the ANC

Backgrounder about South Africa's elections

MORE HERE...

Analysis: The high cost of an unspoken war

Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Foreign Policy, February 2009
(On violence in Latin America)

Analysis by Reese Neader. March 12, 2009
(Creative Commons photo, retrieved from www.pet.dfi.uem.br)

Low-intensity conflict sustained by narcotics trafficking has ravaged Latin America for over half a century. As regional governments continue their efforts to centralize control and reign in separatist groups, a recent spike in drug-related violence has focused new attention on Latin America’s protracted and so-called Drug War. Mexican President Felipe Calderon has deployed 46,000 troops and federal police across the country to combat the rising power of heavily armed drug cartels that are striking back in response to a government crackdown on narcotics trafficking. Likewise, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe continues to escalate a government and paramilitary campagin against the FARC, the communist rebel group that both Venezuela and Ecuador are suspected of aiding to sustain a bloody conflict in Columbia. U.S. government efforts to disrupt the globalized supply and production chain of narcotics have led to protracted, covert military support to escalate the Drug War.

Late last month, the former heads of state of Brazil, Mexico, and Columbia met in Sao Paulo in a highly publicized panel discussion that condemned current U.S. anti-narcotics policies. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the former President of Brazil, spoke about the pressing need for policy reform. "[The U.S. drug war has] demoralized democracy. The population regards the government as inefficient and the policy as corrupt, and altogether this damages the image of the [United States] as well as the efficiency of democracy… being strong and hard-line in combating…drugs has caused democracy to recede," the former president told Foreign Policy magazine in a recent interview.


Impoverished agricultural regions respond to global commodity pricing by pushing the production of high-value cash crops such as coca and marijuana. The production is controlled by heavily-armed political opposition groups that sustain their military resistance campaigns with a steady influx of cash from the international drug trade. The United States, on the other hand, has used billions of tax dollars to support unpopular right-wing governments and their proxy militias that use American combat advisers and military hardware to rage sometimes brutal wars of attrition against separatist groups.

Cardoso complains that U.S. foreign policy in Latin America has proved un-reflexive to the socio-economic pressures and nascent political realities that have redefined the region in recent years. "There is an enormous amount of pressure from the United States and there are no alternatives. That's why it's important to have a new perspective." Now governments across the political spectrum in Latin America, varying in their ideological intensity, are calling loudly for the United States to institute a genuine shift in its regional foreign policy. "Now because of the new administration in the United States, I think there is an opportunity to open the debate," said Cardoso, reflecting a desperate hope across the region that U.S. policy will take a meaningful shift under the direction of President Obama.

Failure to respond will ensure that "…the U.S. government will continue to exert enormous pressure on the Latin American countries to follow their position," continuing a cycle of violence that is spiraling out of control as the global economic crisis intensifies, the former president fears.

Cardoso and the Latin American Commission on Drugs & Democracy advocate the decriminalization of marijuana, focusing law enforcement resources towards the disruption of criminal trafficking networks, and implementing crop replacement campaigns in response to failing coca crop eradication efforts. Cardoso also added that anti-drug campaigns in Latin America must adopt a deeper and more integrated social-based approach, the "mobilization (of) families, churches, workers, and unions."

"The new paradigm is not to depenalize; it's to decrease demand."

MORE HERE...

Analysis: When two become one

Ma Ying-jeou, New York Times, February 2009
(On U.S. involvement in East Asia)

Analysis by Paul Doursounian. March 11, 2009
(Creative Commons photo, retrieved from Wikipedia)

In an interview he recently gave to the New York Times, Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-Jeou answers a series of questions about his policies regarding the island’s main issues: cross-strait and wider international relations, the current sharp economic downturn, and human rights and transparency in Taiwan.

A Harvard law graduate, Mr. Ma was Justice Minister from 1993 to 1996 and mayor of Taipei from 1998 to 2006. He successfully led the Kuomintang party (KMT) through the January 2008 parliamentary election and, with a high 58% of the vote, was himself elected as his country's president in March 2008, thus putting an end to eight years of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administrations.

Mr. Ma campaigned mainly on the improvement of the economy and enhanced cooperation with mainland China, in clear opposition with former president Chen Shui Bian’s separatist views. Based on his strong mandate, he has presided over a marked warming of cross-strait relations thanks to a number of deals reached over economic cooperation, transport, and tourism between the island and mainland. He states his aim to be to “normalize economic relations” in order to ease tensions and promote growth in Taiwan.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Ma's new deal with China has brought substantial benefits, which span “cost reductions, time savings, freer movement of people, goods, services, capital and information, lower political risks, better investment environment.” China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner and the first destination for its investments, which exceed USD 150 billion.

In spite of clashes and protests during the visits of high-ranking officials from the mainland to Taipei, Taiwan's public opinion largely approves this cross-strait détente. Around a third of the population is believed to be pro-independence, but few would be ready to face the war with China that would ensue any formal move towards independence. Even fewer are in favor of immediate unification, but closer economic ties and political status quo seem to satisfy a majority of the country's citizens.

Indeed, Mr. Ma’s stance on the unification issue can be summed up by the phrase: “no unification, no independence, no war.” Since the end of the civil war in 1949, China regards Taiwan as a rebel province and has repeatedly threatened to resort to force were the island to declare independence. Mr. Ma has accepted to resume talks on the basis of the “1992 consensus,” which states that there is only one China but that each party can have a different interpretation of what a statement means. The unification issue has, however, not been discussed for now, and negotiations have instead focused on pragmatic economic cooperation measures.

As it becomes more powerful, mainland China has every intention to achieve unification with Taiwan. Strategically, controlling the strait would significantly add to its maritime power and provide a basis for expansion into the Pacific Ocean. More importantly, unification is widely seen as a necessary symbol of restored national sovereignty and pride in Beijing, due to the country's recent history of foreign invasions, repeated humiliations, and trampled sovereignty.

Mr. Ma is certainly aware of that. His strategy consists in preventing the possibility of a military conflict by boosting cooperation and building trust and reaping all possible benefits of closer economic integration. In the longer term, he banks on time and the internal evolution of China's mainland to possibly achieve unification with a democratic Chinese government.

In that light, the steps to ratify international covenants for human rights, as well as enhance freedom and democracy in Taiwan are a part of a concerted policy: they entrench Taiwan’s specificity, hence making it impossible for Beijing to ignore. Time, cooperation, and tourism helping, Taiwan’s example could have an impact on the mainland’s society and policies in that field, thereby contributing to democratization in China and serving both parties' interests.

A military confrontation is certainly improbable in today’s circumstances, as China does not yet wield enough power to deter an American intervention and recover from the ensuing international condemnation unscathed. Hoping for China to democratize and accept a negotiated and loose integration of Taiwan is however wishful thinking, at least insofar as such a strategy chiefly depends on totally unforeseeable internal developments.

Voters seem to acknowledge Mr. Ma’s policy is the best way to maintain Taiwan’s de facto independence. Yet he was elected on a promised 6 percent annual growth, and the economy is expected to contract severely this year (between -3 and -11 percent). The economic downturn certainly increases the risk of political and social turmoil that could lead to a loss of support for improved cross-strait relations. In a word, keep an eye out...

Learn more about this topic:

Backgrounder on cross-strait relations

Backgrounder on Mr. Ma's popularity

MORE HERE...

Analysis: Robert the Realist

Robert Gates, MSNBC, March 2009 (Video)
(On the Middle East, Southeast Asian developments, Russia)

Analysis by Patrick Hogan. March 10, 2009
(Creative Commons photo, Ohmygov.com)

As a candidate, President Barack Obama was oftentimes perceived as peddling an overly idealistic foreign policy. Take, for example, his argument in favor of unconditional negotiations with “rogue” nations like North Korea or Iran, a stance derided by the McCain campaign and others as dangerously naïve.

Yet realism --the idea that states conduct their foreign policy in order to achieve greater power and security with minimal moral or ethical motivations-- plays a larger role than is sometimes appreciated in the current White House's thinking. This is evidenced in several ways, the least of which isn't President Obama's choice of the very realist Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense. In a recent interview of Gates by David Gregory on NBC’s Meet the Press, one can witness the early days of a realist Obama foreign policy, and a move away from the neoconservative idealism of former President George W. Bush.

It has become cliché to refer to the war in Iraq as the archetypal neoconservative, idealist venture, and a realist turn in foreign policy by the Obama administration will likely mean Iraq will no longer be at the center of the United States' Middle East policy. The president recently committed to a firm 19-month timetable for withdrawal of all combat troops from the country, and when asked if the president might halt that withdrawal in the face of changing circumstances in Iraq, Gates responded: “he always retains the flexibility to change a plan or adjust it, if he thinks it’s in the national security [interests] of the United States.”

So Washington's new focus will be Afghanistan, a war that many realists, as opposed to their opinions on the Iraq war, were widely supportive of from the start. Many felt a real duty to shut down a terrorist safe-haven and thus better secure America from outside threats. Gates himself called Afghanistan “the greatest military challenge” facing the United States, although he also cautioned against the idea that major gains will be made in the country in the short-term.

Iran on the other hand is one nation about which both the Bush and Obama administrations can be said to have shared a realist approach (insofar as both administrations treated Iran as a threat to American security). Gates acknowledged this in his interview, saying: “I don’t think either the last administration or the current one have been distracted from the current problem of Iran and its nuclear program.” The difference may be, however, in the approaches taken in dealing with this threat.

The question, as Defense Secretary Gates puts it, then becomes “how do you get the Iranians to walk away from a nuclear weapons program”? As a chair of the Council on Foreign Relations’ 2004 Iran Task Force, Gates recommended a more open engagement with the country. Stymied in this goal by George W. Bush, Gates has now found a partner in President Obama, who shares his logic that a pacified, engaged Iran may calm tensions in the region writ large (including in Afghanistan).

With the new administration seeking greater engagement with Tehran (Secretary of State Clinton's appointment of Dennis Ross as special adviser on Iran is an example), the neoconservative, regime-change rhetoric of the Bush years has been replaced, for the time being, with a realist approach that seeks to merely to maximize security, without seeking to topple Tehran's leadership.

How long will this realist marriage last?

Gates came into the job with expectations that he would assist President Obama in his foreign policy transition for about a year, then leave the Pentagon. Although there seems to be symmetry between both men’s international outlook, Gates responded to a question about his departure by saying that carrying on to the end of Obama’s first term “would be a challenge.”

More humorously, when asked about the differences of working for both George W. Bush and Barack Obama, Gates simply replied: “that sounds like the subject of a good book.”

One thing is certain, both realists and idealists will be looking forward to reading it.

Visit msnbc.com for Breaking News, World News, and News about the Economy

Learn more about this topic:

Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy

Robert Gates biography

MORE HERE...

Analysis: Brazil rising

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Der Spiegel, May 2008
(On Brazil's energy strategy and regional developments)

Analysis by Reese Neader. February 27, 2009
(Creative Commons photo, Reuters/petroleumworld.com)

The abiding global economic collapse has in many respects escalated the rising trend of a “multipolar” global system; a world dominated by mid-sized powers which structure regional peace and stability in the absence of decisive U.S. power projection. The instability of global financial markets has greatly legitimized the rising power of newly developed states, who at this point appear to be faring slightly better than their Northern counterparts. One of these new powers is Brazil.

While Northern economies flounder and the international financial system remains on life support, Brazil continues to manage a stable 4-6 percent annual growth rate. Having paid off its debts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and still profiting from international trade, the country has embarked on an ambitious program of social spending and infrastructure improvement without increasing the tax burden of its citizens. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has used his administration to demonstrate a measured “third way” of state economic policy that marries leftist ideology with liberal economic measures. The result has been the addition of 20 million citizens to the Brazilian middle class and the extension of access to college funding for an additional 400,000 university students.


German weekly Der Spiegel sat down with President “Lula” (as he is affectionately known in Latin America) to discuss the international role of a rising Brazil. Though the interview took place in 2008, it is a good reminder of Lula’s achievements (and shortcomings?) and appears to be particularly enlightening given Brazil’s coming electoral competition. During his interview, the president put forth his legacy, claiming that sweeping social programs were being implemented in major Brazilian favelas (slums) to combat the social and racial inequality which has caused high rates of violence, drug use, and frequent clashes with heavily armed police in those neighborhoods. “We have allocated $270 billion (€175) to spend on improving slums…We are providing… drinking water, energy, and sewage systems, schools, hospitals, and libraries.”

Lula has also devoted government funds towards, “modernizing…infrastructure such as ports, highways, railways, and airports --all without any new borrowing.” This is possible because Brazil maintains a highly diversified economy with a nascent technology sector and a complex agricultural industry that gives the country a very strong balance of trade.

Brazil became energy independent in 2006 and still is the world’s largest exporter of ethanol. Lula was asked by Der Spiegel about ethanol markets in Europe: “I have always told my European friends that it isn't worth restructuring their well-organized agricultural systems to produce biofuel. We, and the Africans, can do a much better job of it. The European Union should give the Third World a chance to produce biofuel.” In response to inquiries over whether the farming of biomass for fuel jeopardized world food production Lula responded that “this argument applies to neither Brazilian sugarcane nor our palm oil. The production of fuel from basic food commodities is, in fact, unjustifiable.” Adding to Brazilian dominance in new energy markets, the country has discovered “immense oil reserves… off the coast… We expect to start test-drilling in March and start producing oil in 2010. Then Brazil will become a major oil exporter. We want to join OPEC and try to make oil cheaper.”

Perhaps Brazil’s biggest goal is extending its peacemaking capabilities within Latin America. In response to a recent secession crisis in Bolivia, Lula said that “Brazil, together with Argentina and Colombia, has formed the Group of Friends of Bolivia to help the country. When comrade Evo is ready to negotiate, we'll be ready to broker talks.” Because Brazil is rising as a peacemaking, soft power, the chances of its greater influence being welcomed in the international community are much higher than that of many other emerging powers.

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Analysis: Greece's chance to show off

Dora Bakoyannis, POLITIKA, February 2009
(On Greece's OSCE chairmanship and relationship with Serbia)

Dora Bakoyannis, ITAR-TASS, January 2009
(On Greece's OSCE chairmanship and relationship with Russia)

Dora Bakoyannis, Kommersant, January 2009
(On the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and the 2008/9 Ukrainian gas crisis)

Analysis by Diane Dufoix. February 26, 2009
(Creative Commons photo, retrieved from Javno.com)

In three January 2009 interviews with the Russian outlet Kommersant, Serbian paper POLITIKA, and Russian news agency ITAR-TASS, Greece’s Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis appeared optimistic about her country’s presidency of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which will take place throughout the year 2009. One of her main points was that Greece’s chairmanship of the OSCE could be of good omen to improve relationships between the organization’s Western members and Russia. PR or diplomatic lead?

First, Dora Bakoyannis believes that “the OSCE is a well-placed forum for such a dialogue since it is the only regional organization that encompasses the wider Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions.” She points out that the OSCE, the world’s largest regional security organization (with over 55 members), brings everyone “including Russia, the members of the EU and the U.S., to the same table.” One can remember that it was the sole organization able to decide on sending a mission (though a very limited one) to Georgia during the country’s war with Russia a few months ago.

The latter expired recently, however, and the OSCE’s previous, Finnish presidency blatantly failed in organizing a follow-up. Since its taking the lead, Greece has actively “presented all parties concerned with a proposal, a set of ideas, to break the deadlock.” It achieved its first partial success on February 12, when OSCE members agreed on the renewal of the military monitors’ mission in the South-Caucasian country until the end of June 2009, though imperfectly.

But Georgia is just one among many contentious issues that have sparked tensions between Russia and its partners, and in particular between Russia and the European Union (EU). In this context, one might wonder whether or not Greece has any chance of succeeding where many other OSCE chairing countries have failed before.

In any case, the Greek foreign minister seems confident about her relationship with Russia: “I am sure that – as always – our collaboration will be very fruitful and productive.” The nature of the Greek-Russian link supports the view according to which Greece could prove able to trigger better Russia-EU hearings. As Dora Bakoyannis underlines, “Greece and Russia are connected by strong political, economic and cultural ties”: all in all, the two share a common, Orthodox religious culture, similar opinions on various issues (including Kosovo and Cyprus), enhanced energy cooperation (the South Stream project, and the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline), as well as military agreements (Greek purchases of Russian military equipment) in the recent years.

However, the recent legacy of Greece’s foreign policy with regards to European affairs is not one to warrant optimism about the country’s ability (or will) to prompt a constructive dialogue within the EU. Since its accession to the European club in 1981, Greece has often been seen as the “ugly duckling” of European foreign policy. This perception was mainly conveyed by its contentious diplomacy with respect to Turkey and the Balkans (in particular its close links with Serbia and lingering dispute over the Macedonian state’s official name). Greece repeatedly obstructed consensus-building and decision-making within the EU, rather than helped move forward on such issues.

But these times seem over now (or at least one could hope). In the recent years, Greece’s foreign policy has undergone a shift, an attempt to normalize its positions, notably with respect to its regional neighbors and its European counterparts, though some burning issues have yet to find a happy ending. This could partly stem from a socialization process, by and large described by Europeanization theories.

In this context, Greece’s special relationship with Russia --“long-standing ties of friendship,”--, the existence of significant Greek national interests with regards to Russia, and the Athenes’ perceptible desire to prove to its European partners that Greece has the ability and will to act responsibly in Europe and on the world stage could lead us to believe that the unthinkable might have become plausible: Greece could finally prove to be an asset for EU foreign policy.

Learn more about this topic:

Learn more about the Greek-Russian relationship

Read the programme of Greece's OSCE chairmanship

Listen to the OSCE's first permanent Council speech by Dora Bakoyannis, chairperson in office

Read about the decision to extend part of the OSCE's Georgia mandate

Read about the 2003 Greek EU presidency and learn more about the “normalization” of Greek Foreign policy

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Analysis: The faith behind your bank

Felipe Calderon, Gordon Brown, Han Seung Soo, Kgalema Motlanthe, CNN, February 2009 (Video) (On the global financial crisis)

Interview by Soleine Leprince-Ringuet. February 25, 2009
(Creative Commons photo, Reuters/RFI.fr)

“Credit” comes from “credo,” i.e. “I believe,” notes Gordon Brown in this CNN-sponsored panel discussion. If today credit is lacking, it may well be because investors no longer share any common economic faith. The pure market capitalism model has been severely hurt by this crisis, just as the state economy paradigm had been killed by stagflation in the 1970s. With both models having shown their vulnerability to shocks, investors, workers, and consumers are left without any grand economic idea to lay their trust upon.

Hence, the world needs a new economic faith for it to embrace. That is at least the conclusion that arises from this rather exceptional interview, which brought together four heads of states from four different continents: President Calderon (Mexico), Prime Minister Brown (United Kingdom), Prime Minister Han (South Korea), and President Motlanthe (South Africa).


Their discussion about values for the world economy --held in Davos-- was sadly ironic. Davos had for many years been a forum for neoliberal ideas. But in these gloomy days, the debate is shifting back to what the foundations of the world economy should be. Signs of change have come, and it is no longer Milton Friedman and Arthur Laffer who are invoked as spiritual leaders. Rather the only economist mentioned here --and repeatedly-- is John Maynard Keynes, for whom the early twenty-first century might well be the height of a long post-mortem career.

The Weberian idea of a strong link between values and economic performance seems well established in all four participants’ minds. But if it is all good to have general principles and values to look up to, it is still unclear how these will translate into economic reforms. At the end of the Second World War, an appraisal of “solidarity” translated into welfare policies and state interventions. In the 1970s, the choice of “individual liberty” as a core value gave way to liberal policies favouring freer trade and capital investment. What kind of concrete economic policies will a renewed focus on “work” and “effort” for Brown, or on “frugality” and “thrift” for Han, lead to?

How is a new economic faith to be invented? Quite ironically, again, it is Mexico’s and South Korea’s leaders who are asked to provide their “expertise” on financial crises to their Western counterparts. With 30 crises in 25 years of time, Latin America has indeed well experienced the pains of the boom and bust. But what is striking is that in the Latin American debt crises or in the Asian financial crisis, the West still had the faith that a remedy existed, that absolution was possible: high interest rates and structural reforms. What makes this crisis so particular is not its economic impact, but the fact that because it originated in the epicentre of the world economy rather than in its periphery, no longer can countries set their hopes in any “magic potion” to sweep them out of recession. States and business have lost trust in the solutions of the past --the Washington consensus is far from being a consensus anymore, even in the United States. And yet it has not been replaced with any convincing paradigm.

One possibility is that the new paradigm brought about by the crisis will be regionalism. Indeed, with both U.S. leadership and neoliberal ideas damaged, it may be difficult for all World Trade Organization (WTO) member-countries to structure a global economic order. It could be easier to find values and trade-offs at a regional level than at a global one. Moreover, the countries and companies which have most suffered from the crisis are likely to pursue more protectionist measures, as is already the case in France (and the United States?).

What if regionalism does indeed become the cornerstone of the world’s new economic faith? This may represent a welfare loss for the global civil society. Indeed, large protectionist blocks are likely to result in trade diversion. Labyrinthine rules of origin could make international trade more costly and complex. And weaker countries are likely to be left out of these preferential trade agreements, hence their possibly ever-reduced chances of finally developing in full. For most of sub-Saharan Africa, the crisis is not only financial or economic; it is a long-lasting malaise which encompasses disease- and water-treatment along with education. So when the G20 pursues its quest for a new economic faith in the coming months, let it remember that this crisis will have different impacts for the world’s numerous stakeholders.

Learn more about this topic:

Search our special issue file on the global financial crisis

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Analysis: "We love the world, we love the children"

Hillary Clinton, CNN, February 2009
(On South-East Asian relations)

Barack Obama, Al Arabiya, January 2009 (Video)
(On U.S. policy towards the Muslim world and the Middle East peace process)

Barack Obama, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, February 2009 (On U.S.-Canadian trade relations, North American environmental policy, Afghanistan)

Analysis by Patrick Hogan. February 24, 2009
(Creative Commons photo, retrieved from Vote '08)

President Obama made his first foreign visit last week, a day trip to Canada. A new president’s first foreign excursion has traditionally been confined to either Mexico or Canada, where he can modestly wade, rather than immediately plunge, into the turgid waters of international relations, most Executive leaders instead preferring to send their secretary of state to do the initial diplomatic heavy lifting.

Obama has been no different, sending his top diplomat, Hillary Clinton, on her first trip abroad to Southeast Asia. Her goals are typical of what is asked of secretaries of state on these first trips: extend the diplomatic feelers and indicate the course the new administration’s foreign policy is likely to take in the future. Both Obama (Al Arabiya, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) and Clinton (CNN) have alluded to this new course, so far embracing the “soft power” doctrine of multilateralism and diplomacy in recent interviews.


Obama fielded a range of questions regarding the Middle East in his interview with the Arab TV network Al Arabiya, and most of his answers emphasized a reengagement with the region by the United States and a preference towards dialogue over bellicosity: “If we are looking at the region as a whole and communicating a message to the Arab world and the Muslim world, that we are ready to initiate a new partnership based on mutual respect and mutual interest, then I think that we can make significant progress.”

With the world expecting active U.S. involvement in international affairs, Obama’s appointment of Special Envoy to the Middle East George Mitchell and Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke helps the administration cover diplomatic ground while the president becomes more seasoned in foreign affairs and begins a process of rapprochement with the United States enemies.

This theme of multilateralism and dialogue is clearly present in the interview the president gave to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation his visit to Canada. Indeed, it is mentioned in regards to nearly every topic discussed. On the U.S. economic stimulus package: “as we take steps to strengthen the U.S. economy… we are doing so in a way that actually over time will enhance the ability of trading partners, like Canada, to work within our boundaries.” On greenhouse gas emissions: “no country in isolation is going to be able to solve this problem.” On Afghanistan: “I'm going to be continuing to ask other countries to help think through how do we approach this very difficult problem.”

Clinton also stuck with this theme in her interview with CNN from Seoul, South Korea. While one might have expected the Secretary to take a tough line vis-à-vis North Korea, especially in light of its announcement that it will test a new intermediate range ballistic missile, she was instead conciliatory and offered up carrots instead of sticks: “there are tremendous advantages waiting for North Korea – not only a bilateral, normal relationship with the United States, but I think a lot of international support and aid that could come to the people of North Korea.”
When asked about China, one of America’s chief competitors, Clinton was similarly even-handed: “we… hope for cooperation in a peaceful and productive manner on a range of issues where we think that China and the United States have comparable interests.”

While these sorts of statements are par for the course in first diplomatic trips, they serve one vital purpose: to reassure U.S. allies that America remains a strong, reliable partner. Unforeseen events can, and likely will, dampen Washington’s enthusiasm for multilateralism, but so far America looks to want to be friend to the world after years of tension. Yet, can anyone be friends with everyone?

Learn more about this topic:

Overview of Clinton's Asian trip

Detailed explanation of the concept of soft power

Brief history of presidential first trips abroad

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